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S A N A A  M A K H L O U F It is perhaps not surprising that the cho-
rus of voices bemoaning recent develop-
ments among Muslim peoples has been 
growing in strength. What is surprising, 
however, is how many of these concerns 
have been conflated and expressed 
in a single question, repeated like a 
magic mantra: “what went wrong?” In-
deed, the same question seems to have 
been asked for so long by observers of 
Islam and the Middle East that its valid-
ity is not often seriously doubted. Thus, 
when Bernard Lewis published his What 
Went Wrong with Islam? shortly after the 
events of September 2001, few people wondered about the adequacy of 
the question to assess the causes of these events. Rather, where there was 
opposition and criticism, it referred to the answers Lewis proposed, never 
to to the question itself. In a sense, one might say, the “historical events“ 
themselves arose only in order to confirm the validity of the question.
Introducing the question
Intrigued by the power of conviction that carries this way of think-
ing, and wondering how the problems of Muslims and “Islam” are really 
served by it, I suggest that we turn the tables round to ask (and ask with 
urgency): what really happens when the question “What went wrong 
with Islam?” is asked? Wherein lies the attraction 
of the simple (and simplistic) line of thinking that 
runs: something is not right, but it used to be right, 
so something must have gone wrong, yet if some-
thing went wrong, what was it?
A further look at the (long) history of the ques-
tion and at those who ask it reveals that this expres-
sion of concern is not solely found in Western (and 
Westernized) eyes, but is equally central to both the 
Islamic Renaissance, heralded in the works of the 
late nineteenth century Arab reformers, and to the 
rhetoric of contemporary Islamists.
One of the first times the question “what went 
wrong with Islam?” was asked was in the semi-
biographical novel, Ummu ’l-Qura: Proceedings of 
the first Conference on Islamic Renaissance 1316 H 
(1899), by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855–1902). 
Al Kawakibi was a young Syrian journalist who 
joined the circle of the architects of Salafism led by 
Muhammad ‘Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, 
after secretly moving to Cairo in 1899. The novel, 
written and narrated under the pseudonym of al-
Sayyid al-Furati, was presented to Khedive Abbas II, 
who approved its publication and extended his pa-
tronage to al-Kawakibi.1 Though better known for 
his influential work, Taba’i‘ al-istibdad [The Nature 
of Despotism], it is Ummu ’l-Qurra that can be seen 
as one of the earliest examples of what would later 
emerge as a particular and recognizable type of dis-
course: the rhetoric of an Islamism that feeds (sym-
biotically) on the question of “what went wrong?”
Al-Furati records the secret meetings of the So-
ciety of Mecca, which uses the hajj season as a cover for its clandestine 
activities. He leads representatives of Muslim communities, Ikhwan al-
tawhid, in discussions around the most pertinent question of their day: 
“What went wrong with Muslims?” Though it is striking to which extent 
the organization mirrored the “Western” model of conferences, with the 
appointment of a chair, secretary, com-
mittees, etc., the Ikhwan never doubt 
the religious and cultural authenticity of 
their enterprise. 
They embark on this endeavour with a 
sense of history in the making. The mo-
ment is now ripe, al-Kawakibi claims, to 
change the tide in favour of the Muslim 
nations. He heralds the rise of a “van-
guard of free and noble men” which will 
wake the ummah from its slumber.2 His 
Ikhwan profess allegiance to the forth-
coming jihad and vow secrecy to the 
brotherhood. Their war cry, “Zealous 
guardianship of religion over compassion for Muslims,”3 indicates the be-
ginning of a rift that will henceforth ever widen: the rift between loyalty 
for Islam and loyalty to Muslims.
Looking in from the outside
Each speaker offers in turn his analysis of what ails the ummah, trying 
to locate within its traditional structures the sources of the infection. 
Curiously, none stops to question the validity of the diagnosis itself: 
the lowliness of the Muslims is all too evident. They all agree that the 
decline started “more than a 1000 years ago” when the Arab Umayyad 
dynasty lost its powers to “non-Arab elements.” However, after Western 
nations had reversed their fortunes (through their “successful” Refor-
mation and Enlightenment) and gained the upper hand over the Mus-
lims, the latter’s decline has become discernable. Thus, the regression 
that supposedly had begun long ago and had made its way largely 
unnoticed could now be identified precisely because of being able to 
be seen from the “outside.” And the question of “what went wrong?” 
could be asked, and more importantly, answered by those who were 
willing and daring to step “out.” By so doing these concerned activists 
would leave behind their “inherited means of comprehension” and do 
for Islam what “Luther and Voltaire had done for the West.”4 
The extent to which this vision from “the outside” is taken to be the 
model for the comprehension of Islam’s ailments and for the choice 
of their remedies, appears clearly when Al-Kawakibi reports a meeting 
between the Mufti of Kazan and a newly converted Russian Muslim Ori-
entalist. Their cross-cultural dialogue shows that Orientalism can serve 
not only to expose the inadequacy of the traditional ulama but also to 
celebrate, by contrast, the virtues of the original Islam as rediscovered 
by the scientific tools of western scholarship. Al-Kawakibi is totally un-
fazed by the irony that a non-Arab West would be partner to an Arab-
centred Muslim awakening.
The combined efforts of the Ikhwan and the Orientalists centres on 
one “urgent” finding: what must be resisted by all means is the claim 
of the Ottomans to be the legitimate representatives of the Caliphate 
and sovereigns over the Arabian Peninsula. In order to remove them 
from their position at the head of the umma a formulation is needed to 
effectively keep them out of the fold of Islam. According to al-Kawakibi 
and his circle, such a formulation must be both theological and political 
at the same time. The Ikhwan find the required justification of their aims 
in the reformist Wahhabi theology, which excludes Muslims who do not 
adhere to their particular doctrine from the faith altogether and grants 
legitimacy to the fight against them. Accordingly, the Ikhwan hold that 
it is only the Arab muwahiddun (i.e. the Wahhabis), from the “heartland” 
of Islam, who preserve the religion from the corrupting forces that had 
assailed the rest of the Muslim world and which have allowed it to re-
turn again to a benighted state of jahiliya (ignorance).5 These Arabs, with 
their “salafi” orientation, Arabic language proficiency, “pure racial stock,” 
“tribal solidarity,” “aversion to frivolous intellectualism,” and rejection of 
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“exotic forms of Islam like Sufism,” represent the “most authentic” ver-
sion of Islam, al-Islamiyyah. “The religion has originated from amongst 
them and in their tongue,” al-Kawakibi argues, “they are its people, car-
riers, protectors, and its defenders, […] we should not feel reluctant to 
give in to their superior understanding of their religion” and join them 
in thwarting the threat to the “heart” of Islamdom.6 
Best jihad: Silencing the tradition
Whatever the particular form this “threat” to the heart of Islam, be it 
foreign Islam (non-Arab Muslims), false Islam (Sufism), or dead Islam 
(traditional ulama), they are all identified by the same name-tag, 
namely, as “causes of what went wrong” and therefore, as figures of 
“resistance to modernization.”7 Consequently, the main culprits are the 
representatives of “traditional” (pre-modern) Islam, irrespective of their 
particular origin. Moreover, the term “traditional” was not so much the 
result of an in-depth analysis of religion as a foil for political action. 
Correspondingly, the causes for “backwardness” and, thus, the targets 
of reform, were located in the traditional institutions and repositories 
of knowledge that had for centuries informed and shaped the plural-
istic diversity of the Islamic self. Namely, they targeted the ulama and 
jurists, keepers of the “outward” knowledge of the law, and the sufis, 
keepers of the “inward” knowledge of the heart. All of these had to be 
changed, silenced, or sacrificed in the relentless march toward reform.
In response to the inner evils of Islam so perceived, the Ikhwan al-
Tawhid commit themselves to jihad against the enemies of true Islam 
hoping, thereby, to regain the former glory and power of their “pure” 
Arabian heritage. Accordingly, they declare that the best jihad for the 
times consists in humiliating the “hypocrite” ulama.8
In cooperation with the institutions provided by the nation state, the 
Ikhwan propose to use all rhetorical, political, and educational means 
to wage the battle against the existing institutions of the ulama and 
sufi tariqas and help to monitor their activities and public functions. 
One of their recommendations is to place “dissenting” ulama “under 
quarantine,” if they were to teach, give fatwa or counsel outside of the 
official line. Reformed ulamas would then help educate the common-
ers in the basics of tawhid and zealously guard public morality. Sufis 
would be persuaded to return to orthodoxy and guide their disciples to 
gainful employment. Reformed orders would provide social networks 
to serve the community and carry on roles of civic philanthropy like 
running orphanages and social services.
Under the auspices of Khedive Abbas II, identified as the best can-
didate for leading the reawakened ummah, the Society of Ummu’l-
Qurra—a modern elite composed of intellectuals, politicians, activ-
ists—would help establish Arab dominance over a Muslim Reformation 
free of shirk (idolatry) and bid‘a (innovation) based on a return to the 
unadulterated sources: the Quran, and a “cleansed” corpus of authenti-
cated hadith. The doors of ijtihad, now declared open, would yield ra-
tionally controlled pragmatic rulings that could be easily codified. Only 
this time around, ijtihad would not be left to the specialized faqihs but 
rather handed over to the intellectuals to reinterpret and reformulate 
Islamic normativity while at the same time dismantling the classical 
representations of Islamic law.
Many of these recommendations materialized within a short span 
after the publication of the novel. Khedive Abbas, under the influence 
of Lord Cromer, the British Resident, appointed Muhammad ‘Abduh in 
1899 to the position of Mufti, the highest judicial post of Egypt. The “ar-
chitect of Salafism,” and al-Kawakibi’s mentor, was now in charge of re-
forming—along western lines—the administration and curricula of al-
Azhar, shaping generations of intellectual scholars of Islam. Amongst 
his “innovative” fatwas stands out one on the permissibility of accept-
ing interest paid on loans, necessary to advance capitalism and West-
ern commercial dominance in the Muslim world. During the last years 
of his life al-Kawakibi travelled near and far to spread the message of 
Islamiya and nationhood. And, fulfilling their share of the best jihad, 
the ‘Abduh circle routinely targeted the ulamas and sufis, lampooning 
and engraving them in the popular memory as the culprits for “what 
had gone wrong.”
Al-Kawakibi’s writings quickly became staple food for the Egyptian-in-
fluenced awakening and dissemination of Islamism in the Islamic world. 
Although ‘Abduh’s reform circle has not found much favour with present-
day Islamists, the common genealogy and rampant suspicion of tradi-
tional Islam can even be heard through their vociferous antagonism to 
the reformist agenda as well as their variants of “what went wrong.” 
More concerns
The question of “what went wrong?” clearly serves to determine the 
direction of the reform and to empower those who ask it. But who are 
those who are qualified to pass judgement on others? Who analyzes 
their diagnosis, puts it to the test, verifies it, and against which criteria? 
What vested interest do the askers have in the answer? So many more 
questions could be asked. They are rarely asked, though. Seemingly, 
the rhetorical power and dynamics of “What went wrong?,” for instance 
with Islam, is particularly effective at precluding further questions. For 
al-Kawakibi and his intellectual descendents, both sympathetic and 
antagonistic to his ideas, such ruminations are re-
dundant. For him and for them the qualification 
required for asking the question lies in the very 
act of asking it. Nothing more is needed.
His young men are propelled forward through 
the seeming rationality of the question. Estranged 
from their own tradition—“the problem is that 
our religion is not our ancestor’s original reli-
gion”9—they find comfort in mirroring each other 
as “concerned” modern Muslims, looking at their 
tradition from the outside. The question helps 
them construct an echo-chamber where they can 
hear each other and confirm themselves in their 
shared (and quite often ambivalent) world-views, 
mission, goals, and common enemies.
For over a century traditional Islam is sealed and 
not allowed to speak for itself. To say something 
about it, one has to stand outside of it.
Notes
1. First published in Port Said in 1899 
by Muhammad Rashid Rida, a revised 
version appeared in Rida’s (and ‘Abduh’s) 
mouthpiece al-Manar. Citations will be 
from the reprint edition of Mohamed 
Tahhan, ed., Al-A‘mal al-kamila lil-Kawakibi 
[The Complete Works of al-Kawakibi] (Beirut, 
1995). 
2. Ibid., 283. 
3. Ibid., 380.
4. Ibid., 373–74.
5. A concept utilized by Sayyid Qutb, 
ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, half 
a century later in order to justify breaking 
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